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More females than males have been attending Canadian universities over the past decade and 
this gender imbalance in university participation has been increasing. We use the Linear 
Probability and Logit models to investigate the determinants of attending university and 
explore the reasons for the increasing gender imbalance. We find that, in gender-specific 
equations, the values of the coefficients attached to variables and the values of the variables 
themselves are both important in explaining the rising level of the university participation rate 
for women and men. The important variables include a time trend to capture the evolving 
societal norms, the dynamic influence of parental education, the earnings premium for a 
university degree, tuition fees and real income. The increasing gap between the female and 
male participation rates (15 percentage points by 2005) can be accounted for equally by 
differences in the coefficients in female and male participation equations and the widening 
gap in the university premium for women and men. 
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1. Introduction 
Females represent an increasingly large share of the student body attending university. For many 
developed countries, this trend started in the mid to late 1980s. Canadian universities have also 
experienced a dramatic change in the participation rate of females relative to males. Table 1 illustrates 
this trend by presenting the postsecondary (university and college
2) participation ratio of young 
Canadians, aged 18-24, for selected years. The rates of college attendance for females and males have 
been relatively close to each other over this time period. The proportion of females that attended college 
was 0.14 in 1979 relative to 0.11 for males. These numbers diverged somewhat, beginning in the late 
1980s, but ended up at 0.21 and 0.20 respectively in 2005. However, the trends for university 
participation by gender were very different. The participation rates of females and males were, at 0.12 
and 0.10 respectively, nearly equal in 1979. But, by 2005, the university participation rate of females 
reached 0.41, an increase of 242%. The participation rate of males reached 0.26, an increase of 160%. 
Figure 1 illustrates the generally close trajectories followed by the two genders for college attendance 
(broken lines), as well as the diverging paths for university attendance (solid lines). Women now 
represent the majority of students at both college and university campuses. In Canada, for example, for 
the academic year 2000-2001, the enrolment of women at colleges and universities reached 59% of total 
enrolment (Canadian Information Center for International Credentials (2004)). 
This study investigates the reasons for the unbalanced growth in university attendance in Canada 
over this period. We address several questions: (i) What are the main variables that determine 
attendance at university and do these variables evolve differently over time for women and men? (ii) Do 
these variables affect the participation decisions of women and men with different force (i.e. different 
coefficients)? (iii) Do gender-specific differences in variables or in coefficients account for the 
increasing divergence in the university participation rates of women and men?  
We use the Statistics Canada Master Files for the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the 
                                                      
2 In Canada, Community Colleges (colleges for short) are comparable to US junior colleges. Canadian colleges 
offer a number of diploma programs of shorter duration (generally one to two yeas) that are more professionally 
oriented than the academic degree programs (three to four years) offered by universities. Until recently, Canadian 
colleges could not offer degree programs.   3
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) to investigate the determinants of female and male 
university attendance over the period 1977 to 2005. We concentrate on university, rather than college, 
attendance because, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1, it is with respect to the former that a major gender 
imbalance has emerged.  
Although some recent research that attempts to explain the causes of the gender imbalance in 
attending university can be found for the US, only limited research has been carried out for Canada. 
Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko (2006) document the historical emergence of the US ‘College Gender Gap’ 
favoring women and consider reasons for it, both formally and informally. These authors (2006, p. 153) 
suspect ‘two key factors’ for a gap favoring women, namely the greater pecuniary returns from higher 
education for women than men and the greater effort costs involved for boys in preparing for and 
actually attending post-secondary education. Jacob (2002) explores the gender imbalance of 
postsecondary education attendance by using data from the US National Educational Longitudinal 
Survey for a nationally representative cohort of eight-graders in 1988 which was re-surveyed every two 
years until 1994. A number of variables, including non-cognitive ability and returns to higher education, 
are used in the context of the Linear Probability model to estimate separate participation equations for 
women and men and Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) decompositions suggest that differences in characteristics 
or variables (rather than coefficients or behavior) account for almost all of the observed college 
attendance gap for this cohort. Among the variables, Jacob (2002, p. 596) singles out the college 
premium and non-cognitive ability as important forces. 
Our data set does not include information on non-cognitive abilities. This factor may well help 
explain why, at any particular point in time, women are more likely to be successful in entering a 
Canadian university. However, it would be surprising if the non-cognitive abilities of female and male 
children have diverged substantially over time. It is possible that, through broad societal changes in 
gender attitudes, the importance of schooling outcomes (and indirectly the gender-specific 
non-cognitive abilities that influence them) has changed over time. One argument along these lines 
specifically reflecting social change in the education system is that it has become more ‘feminized’ 
over recent decades.  This process, it is argued, includes a trend towards more female teachers in   4
elementary and high school as well as pedagogical changes, such as more frequent testing, that tends to 
favor girls.  There is, however, substantial debate about the merits of the feminization of education 
hypothesis. In many countries the fraction of women teachers at the elementary and especially high 
school level has been increasing and some researchers have argued that girls do better when taught by 
women teachers.
3  As Dee (2005, p. 2) notes, however, ‘ … empirical evidence on whether these 
interactions actually matter is limited and contradictory’.  More generally, studies that follow several 
cohorts of boys and girls and can address changes in non-cognitive abilities and the relative impact 
they have in a changing school system are, not surprisingly, difficult to carry out.  Moreover, it is not 
clear that girls have not always been ‘better’ students at the high school level.  Goldin, Katz, and 
Kuziemko (2006), for example, point out that over the past century girls in the US have consistently 
outperformed boys in post-secondary education. This may suggest that the school system has always 
‘favoured’ the superior non-cognitive abilities of females. The problem in completely resolving this 
question is that data sets which include PSE decisions taken by populations over long periods of time 
do not have the sort of detailed information about non-cognitive abilities and academic preparedness 
that would are required to address these issues.   
Accordingly, we content ourselves with controlling (in ways that we describe below) for these 
secular trends so as not to contaminate our estimation efforts in other directions. We do investigate the 
significance of another secular force, the university premium. To our knowledge, Johnson and Rahman 
(2005) is the only other Canadian study taking this factor into consideration. In their research, which 
was based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and covered the years 1976-2003, the return to university 
education is found to have a positive, albeit not statistically significant, effect on university 
participation. Although male and female individuals are separated for regression purposes, the gender 
imbalance issue is not an explicit concern in that study. Finally, the LFS does not include important 
information, such as family income, that helps shape the university participation decision. Finnie et al 
(2005) also investigate the determinants of attending postsecondary institutions in Canada. Family 
                                                      
3 There are, of course, other changes that may benefit girls over boys.  For example, Burman (2005, p. 353) points 
out that the new AS level system in the UK has been predicted to benefit girls due to the fact that girls do best on 
continuous assessment.   5
background variables appear to be important determinants of participation in postsecondary education. 
Although gender-specific regression results are presented in their work, they do not explicitly address 
the gender imbalance issue. Moreover, their study does not include information about tuition fees which 
have increased dramatically since the mid 1990’s
4. A host of other features of this study presented 
below differentiate it from earlier efforts. 
To try to explain the increasing gender imbalance, we use Linear Probability and Logit models to 
explain university attendance for each gender. Following Jacob (2002), we analyze estimates from these 
models in the context of the Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) decomposition techniques applied to the Linear 
Probability models. We also use the techniques recently proposed by Fairlie (1999, 2006) to construct 
similar decompositions in the context of the Logit models. Both decomposition techniques examine 
how, on average, differences in the values of variables and their coefficients combine to explain 
differences in the average university attendance by gender. We also use the results from the two models 
to see how, in light of the estimated gender-specific coefficients, the evolution of variables through time 
influences university attendance by gender. We find that the Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), Neumark 
(1988) and Fairlie (1999, 2006) decompositions, which examine the relative importance of 
characteristics and coefficients over the entire period, averaging over all years in the sample, point 
mainly to differences in characteristics, notably the university premium, as the reason for the average 
difference in the female and male university participation rates. In this sense, our results complement 
those in Jacob (2002). The relative importance of characteristics and coefficients is somewhat sensitive 
to how the university premium (broadly speaking, the additional earnings that accrue to those with a 
university degree relative to those with high school only) is defined and we explore several possibilities.  
Going beyond the entire-sample, average, decompositions above and looking at the predictive 
performance of our estimated models over time, we conclude that the growth in the level of the 
university participation rate over time is shaped by the evolution of time varying regressors such as a 
time trend, parental education, the university premium, tuition fees, and real income - in that order. The 
                                                      
4 The literature related to the effect of tuition fees on Canadian postsecondary education enrolment includes 
Christofides, Cirello and Hoy (2001), Rivard and Raymond (2004), Junor and Usher (2004), Johnson and Rahman 
(2005), Neill (2005), Coelli (2005), and Fortin (2005).   6
trend stands in for a host of socioeconomic forces that cannot be modeled and (given this conditioning) 
makes possible a clearer definition of the role of other variables that also have a time dimension. A 
significant new result is the cumulative importance of the parental education variables: As more parents 
get more education and, given that this influences the children’s university participation positively, 
more children are encouraged to go to university; this force cumulates over time and shows up in an 
important way when beginning and end-of-sample predictions are compared. We explore this force for 
single as well as couple-based families. The university premium is also an important force in shaping 
the predicted level of the participation rate. Increases in tuition fees act as a (more modest) force in the 
opposite direction. Real income increases contribute only slightly to the secular growth in participation 
rates. The increasing gap between the predicted female and male participation rates is explainable 
equally by individually small but important overall differences in the coefficients of (or the behavior in) 
gender-specific equations and by differences in the only gender-specific variable in the models, namely 
the university premium. 
In section two, we present more details on the trends in female and male participation rates. In 
section three, data and variables used in this study are explained in detail. In section four, results are 
presented and analyzed. In section five, a summary and some concluding comments are provided.  
 
2. Female and Male Trends in University Attendance  
As noted in Table 1, the university participation rates for females and males, aged 18-24, have been 
increasing over time but the former have been increasing at a higher rate. In Tables 2 and 3, the 
participation rates for females and males in different income quintiles are presented
5 for selected years. 
In 1979, the participation rate for females, in Table 2, was marginally higher than that for males, in 
Table 3, for all but the third quintile which was the same. By 1994, the female participation rate was 
uniformly higher than that for males and, by the end of the sample period, the gender differences were 
very pronounced indeed. It is interesting that the relative likelihood (the proportion in the fifth quintile 
divided by that in the first quintile) shrank somewhat faster for females than for males: In 1984, for 
                                                      
5 The sampling weights for each survey are used in the calculation of all means.   7
example, these values (from Tables 2 and 3 respectively) were 4 for females and 4.83 for males. By 
2005, these values were 1.97 for females and 3 for males. This suggests that family income may play an 
important and gender-specific role in explaining the university participation decision. 
However, family income is not the sole factor influencing individual participation decisions. 
Tables 4 and 5 present the participation patterns for female and male children given the absolute value 
of family income over time. In any given year, an individual from a family with higher income is 
generally more likely to go to university regardless of gender. However, it is also clear that, even in a 
given real income bracket, there is a powerful upward trend for university attendance. This trend is far 
stronger for females than males, especially for lower-income families. This suggests that some other 
(time-varying) variables, in addition to family income, should be included in analyses of these issues.  
Table 6 shows the university premium calculated for all the years under investigation; a number 
of variants, discussed in section 3, are included. Focusing for the moment on the last two columns (i.e. 
the three-year moving average, Jacob, variant), in each and every year in the sample, the female 
university premium is higher than the male premium. Both premiums increased over time, but the 
female premium increased (from 1.61 in 1977 to 2.03 in 2005) more than the male one (from 1.24 in 
1977 to 1.54 in 2005). It is noteworthy that these observations hold regardless of the definition of the 
university premium adopted. Since the premium may influence the incentive to attend university, it is 
important to take its behavior into account as we attempt to understand why women have shown an 
increasing interest in university education as compared to men.  
The Canadian university system imposed dramatic increases in tuition fees over the last two 
decades. Real tuition fees have roughly doubled during the period under discussion – see Appendix A. 
The implied increase in the cost of obtaining a university education represents a time-varying change 
that may moderate any secular trend towards increased participation and must be taken into account. 
Beyond these two time-varying forces, a host of other secular socioeconomic developments have 
been influencing university participation over the period studied, particularly for women. These are 
surveyed in Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko (2006) and include the increasing labor force participation rate 
of women, the fact that marriage occurs much later in life and the increasing acceptance of women in a   8
variety of occupations. These forces are not easy to identify individually and are not the main focus of 
this study. We, therefore, include a time trend that should mop up all secular societal and economic 
forces not specifically accounted for in our equations.   
 
3. Data Sources and Variable Description 
In this paper, the Statistics Canada Master Files for the SCF, covering the years 1977 to 1997, and 
the SLID (which took over the role of SCF), covering the years 1998 to 2005, are used. All statistical 
work was physically carried out at the Statistics Canada Data Resource Centres of Toronto and 
Waterloo and results obtained were released by these organizations. Due to restrictions in the Master 
Files of the 1975 SCF, data for that year are not included in our analysis. In addition, data for 1976, 1978, 
1980 and 1983 are not used either as these were small-sample years of the SCF. Thus, 1977 is the 
starting point of the sample while 2005 was the last available year of the SLID Master Files. When 
constructing the data set used in the econometric analysis, care was taken to set up variables in such a 
way as to avoid a seam between the SCF and SLID part of the sample – as an example, see footnote 6. 
Robb et al (2003) compare the SCF, SLID and the LFS in the context of studying the education 
premium and conclude that, for that particular purpose, combining data from the SCF and SLID is not 
unreasonable. As an extra precaution, the econometric analysis below includes the dummy variable S 
which takes the value of 1 when an observation comes from SLID and is otherwise equal to 0. The 
variable S would mop up any intercept shift at the seam between the SCF and the SLID. Unless 
otherwise stated, sample weights are used throughout. 
Our units of analysis are the young (aged 18 to 24) adults in economic families defined as groups 
of persons residing together and related by blood, marriage or adoption. For the purpose of investigating 
the possible factors influencing university attendance, we use only the sub-sample of economic families 
with children between 18 and 24 in the corresponding survey year. Using the Master Files, we combine 
information from the individual and family files in order to construct data for individuals, by gender, but 
for whom important family characteristics (such as family income, the number of children in the family 
and the education of the Head and Spouse) are available. We use the Linear Probability and Logit   9
models to analyze the university participation behavior of these individuals. PROBUf equals 1 for a 
female child in a family if that child attends university and it equals zero otherwise. Similarly, PROBUm 
equals 1 for a male child in a family if that child attends university and it equals zero otherwise. 
Our equations condition on the total number of children (Children) and its square (Children 2) in 
the economic family within which the individual resides. These are all children aged 18-24. We are 
aware of a number of arguments in the literature concerning the possible influence of the total number 
of children on the probability of any one child in the family attending university. For instance, a higher 
number of children may, other things equal, mean that less family resources are available to finance 
university education for any child. On the other hand, there may be mutual academic learning and 
transference of knowledge concerning the university application process in large families and these 
may reduce the ‘cost’ of any one child attending university. Since these issues are not the main focus of 
our analysis, we adopt the quadratic specification that is flexible enough to capture a variety of possible 
forces and let the data determine the shape of the underlying relationship. 
Tuition fees (Tuition) represent an important cost component of attending university. This may 
be particularly so for the children of low-income families operating in the context of liquidity 
constraints and capital market imperfections. The tuition fee variable for each year is generated by 
using the tuition fees for Arts programs in the largest university of each province of residence. Nominal 
fees are converted into real terms by deflating with the All Items Consumer Price Index (1992=100) for 
the largest city in each province. The real tuition fee variable thus constructed is reported, for each year 
and province, in Appendix A. 
Family income (Income) is another potentially important variable. We define family income as 
the sum of the parents’ after-tax income and deflate by the All Items Consumer Price Index (1992=100) 
for the largest city in the province in which the economic family resides. Since the relationship between 
postsecondary attendance and Income may not be linear, we include a quadratic term in Income, labeled 
Income 2.  
When considering the cost of attending university, transportation and rental expenditures are 
important elements to be taken into account. Living far from a university may mean that university   10
education is costlier than when living in a city with a university. At the other extreme, living in a large 
city, where more than one university may be available, increases the choice of available programs and 
may increase the probability that a student can study while living at home. To capture these forces, we 
use the dummy variables Urban A and Urban B, to generate a proxy for these cost considerations. The 
variable Urban A is equal to 1 if the economic family lives in a small urban area (29,000-99,000 
inhabitants) where at most one university is available; otherwise it equals 0. The variable Urban B is 
equal to 1 if the economic family lives in a large urban area (more than 99,000 inhabitants) where, 
generally, one or more universities are available (all principal metropolitan areas have at least one 
university); otherwise it equals 0. The default category is rural areas and small communities where very 
few universities are available.
6 We would expect Urban B to have a greater influence on PROBU than 
Urban A. The role of the proximity to university was examined by Frenette (2006) and, in a different 
context, by Card (1995). 
Parental education often conditions a child’s participation in university education. Because our 
sample contains single-parent as well as couple-based families, we adopt a specification that can 
appropriately account for parental education regardless of the nature of the family unit - we have tried to 
distinguish between male and female single-parent Heads of Family but we do not have enough 
observations to allow for reliable inference at that level of detail. The following dummy variables 
capture the Head’s educational attainment: NonGrad equals 1 if the family Head has not completed high 
school; it equals 0 otherwise. This variable represents the omitted category. High School equals 1 if the 
family Head has completed high school but no further education; it equals 0 otherwise. Some Postsec 
equals 1 if the family Head has had some post-secondary education but received no certificate, diploma 
or degree; it equals 0 otherwise. Postsec Diploma equals 1 if the family Head attended postsecondary 
education and received a certificate but no degree; it equals 0 otherwise. Degree equals 1 if the family 
Head has a university degree; it equals 0 otherwise. The above set of variables captures the influence of 
parental (the Head’s) education in the case of single-parent families. In the case of couples, the above 
                                                      
6 In 2006, of the 35 communities (Cities, Towns, or Communities) in Urban B, 30 had at least one university; of 
the 52 communities in Urban A, 8 had one university each; in the entire default category of all remaining small 
communities and rural areas in Canada, only 3 small universities exist.    11
variables which characterize the Head’sF
7 level of education need to be supplemented by analogously 
defined variables for the Spouse. The econometric specification used to implement all these cases is 
01 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 () ( ) . . . ( * ) ( * ) . . . ch h s s Y D DH DH D S D S β ββ ββ β β 1 =+ + + + + + + +        (3.1) 
where D=1 for couples and 0 for single-parent families,  1 H and  1 S  are the dummy variables referring 
to the first level of achievement (i.e. High School) beyond the default level for Heads and Spouses 
respectively, the subscript 2 refers to the second level of achievement (i.e. some postsecondary 
education), and so on. Thus, single-parent families are characterized by the overall equation constant 
(which does not appear above) and the coefficients 1 β ,  2 β  and so on for other levels of educational 
attainment. Couples have a further constant term  0c β added to the overall equation intercept. In addition, 
the Head’s education variables within couples carry additional effects on the coefficients for 
educational levels 1, 2, and so on given by 1h β , 2h β , etc. On the other hand, the Spouse’s educational 
variables 1, 2 and so on carry the effects given entirely by the coefficients s β1 , 2s β , and so on. This way 
of modeling the influence of parental education makes it possible to consider whether, other things 
equal, a female or male child of a couple-based family is more likely to attend university than an 
otherwise identical female or male child of a single-parent family. We are also able to consider whether, 
in a couple-based family, the educational attainment of the Head is more or less important than that of 
the Spouse and to do so according to the gender of the child. A further point to note is the feedback loop 
that exists between parental education and the propensity of children to attend university. By the end of 
our sample, the level of education of the parents is very much higher than at the beginning and this 
induces more children to attend university. For example, the 1977 proportion of Heads and Spouses in 
the data for the female equations who had Degree=1 was (reflecting the history of the past) 0.09 and 
0.03 respectively; by 2005 these values were, at 0.22 and 0.16 respectively, very much higher. These 
numbers for single-parent Heads were 0.10 in 1977 and 0.26 in 2005. We are able to comment on the 
                                                      
7In the SCF, Head refers to the husband, while in SLID it refers to the main earner in each family. Because we had 
access to the Master  Files, we were able to construct our data imposing the SCF convention (since it holds for 
most years) thereby avoiding one possible reason for a ‘seam’ between the two data sets.   12
quantitative significance of these increases in parental educational attainment by gender and by type of 
family. 
When investigating the problem of university attendance for the whole of Canada, it is natural to 
take regional aspects into consideration. This is because the incentive to attend postsecondary education 
is likely to be related to region-specific effects, such as differences in provincial student loan programs, 
which are too diverse and complex to be included here. As noted by JR, although one should compute 
tuition costs net of any scholarships or loan information (including subsidies), this is not practical given 
the complex rules around the interest rate and repayment system, which are person-specific and have 
changed over time. Moreover, there are also subsidies built into the tax system which are not easy to 
model given their person-specific nature. Hence, provincial dummy variables are used to capture 
intercept differences between provinces, with British Columbia as the omitted category. 
The university premium is an important influence on the decision to attend university – Jacob 
(2002, pp. 590-1) provides a sketch of the relevant theoretical processes. However, the empirical 
implementation of the premium is not clear cut and we have carried out all our work with a number of 
variants. Bar-Or et al (1995), Burbidge et al (2002), and Robb et al (2003) demonstrate that the 
university premium calculated from Canadian survey data (LFS, the SCF, and the SLID) is relatively 
constant over time when more than five years of experience are taken into account. However, 
individuals contemplating the possibility of university education may monitor primarily the earnings of 
the cohorts immediately ahead of them, rather than including those close to retirement. With this notion 
in mind, it is possible to think of the University Premium as the average additional earnings that accrue 
to individuals with up to five (or in our second variant of University Premium ten) years of experience 
beyond their university degree relative to the average additional earnings that accrue to individuals with 
up to five (or in our second variant ten) years of experience beyond the completion of high school. Thus, 
for those with a university degree, we select employees aged 25 to 29 (or in our second variant 25-34) 
and, for those with 11-13 years of schooling, we select employees aged 19 to 23 (or in our second 
variant 19-28). Jacob (2002, p. 591) opts, instead, for a comparison of the earnings of college and 
high-school graduates at the same age bracket (25-34). The Jacob (2002) age bracket is the basis for our   13
third variant of University Premium. For each of the three variants, we calculate the average earnings 
for the relevant age groups, on a province-by-province basis, by survey year and the University 
Premium is defined as the ratio of the average earnings for those with a university degree to those 
without. Because the provincial variation in this variable is substantial and because graduates tend to, at 
least initially, search for employment in their province of residence, the value of University Premium is 
calculated separately for each province and is assigned to each individual according to her/his province 
of residence.
8 Because the annual averages are relatively noisy, we also define three-year moving 
averages of the yearly concepts described above and use these as the basis for constructing further 
variants of University Premium which we also use. Thus, in total, six variants are utilized. These 
calculations are done for women and men separately and the gender-specific University Premium is 
assigned to the women and men in our sample. The six variants are presented in Table 6, where the 
numbers for each year are the gender-specific averages of the provincially based University Premium 
values assigned to each individual in the sample by province of residence. As can be seen, the 
University Premium is higher for women than men and increases more for women than men over time. 
The moving average specifications are less noisy. While we conduct our analysis using all six variants, 
we report most results using the moving average version of the Jacob (2002) age bracket specification - 
the two rightmost columns of Table 6F
9
.. 
Tuition fees and the University Premium have clear time dimensions but may not adequately 
capture secular forces that operate on the propensity to attend university. For this reason we include a 
time trend (Trend) with observations for 1977 taking a value of 1, 1979 a value of 3, and so on to 2005. 
                                                      
8 In Canada, most individuals go to university within province. Burbidge and Finnie (2000) use data from the 
National Graduate Survey of cohorts that completed a post-secondary diploma in 1982, 1986, and 1990 and were 
interviewed after graduation. Over these three cohorts, 6.3%, 7% and 6.5% respectively attended university out of 
their home province. These authors also report that, five years after graduation, the percentage of graduates from 
the same cohorts who had changed province of residence was 14.8%, 13.5% and 12.7% respectively. Therefore, 
using tuition fees and calculating the University premium based on the province of residence is justified. 
UNESCO (2006, p. 45) reports that only ‘… 3% of Canada’s tertiary students are mobile’, meaning that they 
attend university outside Canada.  
9 We use full-time full-year paid employees, thus avoiding possible reporting problems involving the 
self-employed.    14
Appendix B gives the number of individuals appearing in our samples by year. These numbers 
reflect the fact that the percentage of unmarried men living at home is higher than that of women. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Main Results 
To explore the quantitative relationships alluded to above, two models are utilized. The Linear 
Probability model, estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), is generally viewed as a benchmark. 
It is the model used by Jacob (2002) in his analysis of the US cohort. The dependent variables are 
PROBUf   and PROBm. The independent variables are Tuition, Income, Income 2, Children, Children 2, 
Urban A, Urban B, the Head’s and Spouse’s education dummy variables allowing for family structure 
as in equation 3.1, the provincial dummy variables, S, University Premium and Trend. 
Table 7 provides results for the two genders separately, for the sample pooled across the genders 
and for the latter but with a female dummy variable included – more on the last specification appears 
below. Coefficients and the ratio of coefficients to estimated standard errors are also provided. An F test 
for the structural homogeneity of the male and female equations suggested that separate equations 
should be estimated. In all four equations, a concave relationship between PROBU and Income as well 
as Children can be observed.
10 Thus, increases in each of these variables increases PROBU but at a 
decreasing rate up to a maximum. In the case of Children, that maximum is (rounding up) three for both 
genders, suggesting that any positive scale effects favoring university attendance are exhausted fairly 
early, leaving children from larger families at a disadvantage. Parental education levels play an 
important role in determining university participation. In the simplest case in Table 7, that of a 
single-parent family, a more educated Head is likely to be associated with increased probability of 
university participation especially for female children. This effect for girls reaches 29.6 percentage 
points for Heads with a degree (relative to Heads with incomplete high school). In couple-based 
families the overall parental effects are stronger but there is a noteworthy difference in the mechanisms 
for girls and boys. In the case of the former, generally negative additional Head effects (especially for 
                                                      
10 Unless otherwise stated, all tests are two-sided and conducted at the 5% level.   15
higher levels of education) are dwarfed by strong positive Spousal effects. In the case of boys, the 
additional Head effects are not significant and the Spousal effects are still positive and significant. Thus, 
the parental effects for couple-based families are generally stronger than those in single-parent families. 
The overall coefficient for Degree is stronger for Heads than Spouses for both genders, suggesting that 
the father’s educational attainment is more influential than that of the mother. The coefficients on Urban 
A and Urban B suggest that children from families living in urban areas, particularly large ones, are 
more likely to attend university than those from rural areas. The provincial dummy variables show 
some significant differences in PROBU between each province and British Columbia, with Prince 
Edward Island being the strongest case in point. Tuition carries the anticipated negative coefficient in 
all equations. University Premium has the expected positive coefficient in all equations and is 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. It is important to note that these effects are 
well-established even in the presence of the significant Trend. The seam variable S achieves 
significance only in the pooled sample with no female dummy variable, suggesting that individuals 
from the SLID data do not have an obviously different propensity to attend university. We have checked 
for structural breaks at points other than the SCF/SLID seam using CUSUM tests but have found none. 
Jacob (2002) used standard decomposition techniques to evaluate the extent to which the 
variables in the Linear Probability models for females and males in Table 7 explain the gender 
participation gap. Following Oaxaca and Ransom (1994, 1998) and Neumark (1988) the difference 
between female and male attendance probabilities can be written as:  
() ( ) ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ' ' ' ' ' '
m p m p f f p m f m m f f m f X X X X X X P P β β β β β β β − + − + − = − = −          (4.1) 
The scalars  f P and  m P are the observed and predicted probabilities of female and male participation 
rates, i.e. of PROBUf and PROBUm respectively.  f X and  m X  are k×1 vectors of the mean values of 
the k independent variables in the female and male sub-samples.  f β ˆ and  m β ˆ  are the k×1 vectors of 
estimated coefficients, in Table 7, for the female and male regressions respectively.  p β ˆ is the k×1 vector 
of coefficients estimated from the pooled regression, also in Table 7. Since Fairlie (2006) presented 
results with the pooled sample containing a female dummy variable, we explore (columns 7 and 8,   16
Table 7) this possibility as well. In the decomposition of equation (4.1), the first term gives the role of 
the difference in the average value of the female and male characteristics. The second term is 
interpreted as the female advantage (for university attendance) and the third term is interpreted as the 
male disadvantage. It is well-known that using the pooled coefficients as the standard circumvents the 
sensitivity in the decomposition results that would emerge if either the female or the male estimated 
coefficients were used instead – as in the early forms of these decompositions. An important difference 
between this paper and that of Jacob (2002) is that we explore participation trends over a very long 
period, rather than differences at a point in time.  
Table 8, column 1, shows the decomposition results that are implied by the first term in equation 
(4.1) and the pooled sample estimates  p β ˆ in Table 7 that exclude the female dummy variable. Rows 1 
and 2, Table 8, show the average participation rate for the whole period for females and males 
respectively; note that, by a property of OLS, these numbers represent both the predicted and actual 
participation rates. Row 3 shows the difference between the female and male averages. Rows 4 and 5 
show (in levels and percentages respectively) the part of row 3 that can be explained by differences in 
Tuition, while row 6 provides the relevant standard errors – their size suggests that all effects are 
statistically significant. Rows 7 to 9 deal analogously with the part of row 3 that can be explained by 
differences in Income and Income 2, rows 10 to 12 the part of row 3 that can be explained by differences 
in the University Premium and rows 13 and 14 the part of row 3 that can be explained by all the 
characteristics in Table 7. The difference between the female and male participation rates is 7.74 
percentage points. As in Jacob (2002, Table 3), almost all (94.69 %) of this participation gap can be 
explained by the difference in the average values of characteristics between females and males, leaving 
very little role for differences in coefficients.
11 Among the independent variables, only University 
Premium is capable of explaining the difference in characteristics to any great extent, contributing 
81.56% of the difference of 7.74 percentage points. This is not surprising given that a random sample of 
female and male children is being compared; the average values of their respective characteristics (say   17
Income) are likely to be similar except in the case of variables (such as the University Premium) which 
have a gender-specific dimension. For this reason, we go beyond the Oaxaca and Ransom (1994, 1998) 
and Neumark (1988) decompositions to also evaluate the contribution over time of each variable to the 
predictions of the female and male equations and to the gap between them. Before turning to that 
evaluation in section 4.2, we offer an improvement (and a simultaneous check and sensitivity test) to the 
Linear Probability model. 
The finite-sample assumptions entailed in the OLS regressions and hypothesis test procedures in 
Table 7 are too strong, given that the distribution of the residual term does not follow the normal 
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where the right hand side of the equation is the logistic distribution function and the values of the k 
variables for the ith observation in  i X are the same as those in the Linear Probability model. The k×1 
vector β contains the coefficients on the k variables. Decomposition procedures in the context of the 
Logit model were proposed by Fairlie (1999, 2006). These decompositions focus on the difference of 
the average values of the characteristics, i.e. the first term in equation (4.1). The average (over the N 
observations i) contribution of an independent variable 1 X to the gender gap can be expressed in 
obvious notation as 
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The contribution of  2 X to the gender gap is  
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This process goes on until all observation values of female variables are substituted with male 
observation values. Here, F is the logistic distribution function,  N denotes the number of observations 
                                                                                                                                                                     
11 The role of characteristics is lower when other versions of University Premium are used. It is important to note 
that University Premium is always statistically significant and quantitatively important, regardless of the variant 
in Table 6 that is used. For details in the context of the Logit model, see Table 10.   18
and 
p β ˆ is the k×1 vector of Logit coefficients estimated using the pooled sample of male and female 
observations.
12 This equation holds for the logistic distribution in (4.2). In practice, it is unlikely that the 
number of observationsN will be the same for the male and female sub-samples. Some observations 
must be dropped from the larger sub-sample so as to keep the same number of observations for the 
above switching process. In order to avoid biased estimation, a simulation process is suggested by 
Fairlie (1999, 2006). In this paper, the following Fairlie-based simulation process has been conducted: 
(i) Estimate a Logit model for the pooled sample; (ii) Predict the probability of participation, using 
results from above step, for each individual in both the male and female sub-samples; (iii) The number 
of observations for males exceeds that for females. Randomly draw samples from the male sub-sample 
that have the same number of observations as in the female sub-sample; (iv) Sort the male and female 
data by the predicted probabilities; (v) Do the switching process, variable by variable, as described in 
(4.3) and (4.4); (vi) Repeat steps (iii) to (v) 1000 times. Use the average decomposition result as the 
final decomposition output.  
The switching process described in (4.3) and (4.4) is switching from female to male observations. 
It is also possible to do the reverse and we will report results from using both switching processes. 
Another problem is that, when using the survey data, generally the sample weights should be 
considered. When we do the switching process, we need to decide which weight, the weight with 
respect to female or male observations, should be used. We report results using both sets of weights as 
well as no weights. 
For each iteration, standard errors are calculated as 
                                                      
12 Fairlie (2006) includes a gender dummy variable (Female) in the pooled regression but its coefficient is not used 
in the decompositions. It is possible that, by including a female dummy into the pooled regression, we introduce a 
‘discrimination’ term in the regression equation which may distort the no-discrimination counterfactual. Thus, in 
our main tables, we use the pooled results in Table 9 which do not include a female dummy variable. However, we 
repeated the analysis using the pooled results which include the female dummy variable. Characteristics still 
explain an important portion of the gender imbalance and the University Premium is the main reason for this. 
Nevertheless, two quantitative differences should be mentioned. First, the role of characteristics is predictably 
smaller since the female dummy variable which is not included in the decompositions does much of the 
‘explaining’. Second, the role of University Premium is correspondingly scaled down. For brevity’s sake, these 
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where 
ff
i X are the values (in row vector form) of the ith observation on the k variables in the first 
round bracket of equation (4.3), 
mf
i X are the values (in row vector form) of the ithobservation on the k 
variables in the second round bracket of equation (4.3), and  f is the logistic probability density 
function.  
Logit output is presented in Table 9. Generally, we have very similar results for the Logit and 
Linear Probability models. Notice, however, that (i) the couple-based parental effects for female and 
male children are more similar to each other than in Table 7, (ii) the University Premium now has a 
marginal effect which is somewhat higher for females than males and (iii) that the seam variable S is 
never significant. Continuing with the approach in Jacob (2002), we now focus on the Fairlie 
decomposition results using the Logit regression coefficients. Columns 2-4, Table 8, report results for 
the switching process from female to male observations using female, male, and no weights 
respectively.
13 Columns 5-7, Table 8, report results for the switching process from male to female 
observations using female, male, and no weights respectively. The overwhelming qualitative 
conclusion from these additional columns in Table 8 is consistent with that reached using the Linear 
Probability model and column 1, Table 8. Indeed, these additional columns in Table 8 suggest that 
effectively all the average gender participation gap is accountable by differences in the average values 
                                                      
13 Note that, when no weights are used, the Logit results are re-estimated without weighting the individual 
observations. When switching from the characteristics of one gender to those of the other, gender-specific weights 
produce some difficulty of interpretation and it is more straightforward to focus on the no-weight results in 
columns 4 and 7, Table 8. Note that when the part of the gender gap attributable to characteristics exceeds the 
observed gap itself (as is the case in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, Table 8) the implication is that, based on the average 
values of characteristics, the participation gap should have been even larger than observed according to the 
estimation.   20
of characteristics, mainly the University Premium. As a check and further sensitivity analysis, Table 10 
provides the percentage of the average gender gap attributable to the University Premium when the five 
other definitions of this variable are used in the context of both the Linear Probability and Logit models. 
In almost all cases, these percentages are high; they are higher when more years of experience are taken 
into account, when the Jacob window is used and when the moving average specification is adopted - 
note that some of the information in Table 8 is repeated, for the reader’s convenience, in the rightmost 
column of Table 10. Table 10 also includes a similar analysis when the dummy variable Female is 
included in the participation equations - as in the rightmost columns of Tables 7 and 9; as might be 
expected from the fact that the female dummy absorbs much of the gender difference in the 
participation rates, the percentages due to characteristics and the University Premium in particular are 
lower, albeit continuing to be substantial. 
The results in the Linear Probability and Logit models are mutually consistent and reinforcing and 
the various decompositions carried out are very suggestive of the role played by characteristics 
generally and particularly the University Premium in explaining the difference in gender participation 
rates over the entire time period 1977 to 2005. Of course, by construction, these decompositions do not 
attempt to describe the secular growth in the level of the participation rates for women and men, the 
increasing gap between them and the role of the variables in Tables 7 and 9. What we now focus on are 
the model predictions for the gender-specific participation rates, the increasing gap between them, and 
the relative quantitative importance of variables and coefficients in explaining this behavior. These 
issues are addressed, in the context of a different methodology, in the next sub-section. 
4.2 The Secular Role of Variables 
Figures 2 and 3 plot the (annual average) predicted values for the female (top solid line marked 
with Δ) and male (bottom solid line marked with ×) participation rates from the Linear Probability and 
Logit models respectively. The predictions from the two models are very similar and quite accurate 
when compared to the actual yearly average participation rates in Figure 1. In addition, Figures 2 and 3 
provide the Linear Probability and Logit predictions for the female (top broken line marked with Δ) and 
male (bottom broken line marked with ×) participation rates when, following the spirit of the Oaxaca   21
and Ransom (1994, 1998) and Neumark (1988) approach, the pooled (no female dummy) estimates in 
Tables 7 and 9, respectively, are used. These predictions give the models’ best guess as to what the 
female and male participation rates would be under a common set ( p β ˆ ) of coefficients. In this sense, we 
are able to examine the female and male predictions, through time, abstracting from any differences in 
the estimated coefficients for females and males - that is assuming that there are no behavioral 
differences between the genders.
14 These pooled coefficient predictions are more extreme (i.e. higher 
for females and lower for males) than the model predictions at the beginning of the sample, about equal 
to the model predictions in the middle of the sample and less extreme in the last ten years of the sample. 
On average, the pooled predictions would be close to the own-coefficient predictions for each gender 
signifying no behavioral differences and, consistent with results in the previous sub-section, attributing 
the gap between the predicted values to differences in the average values of the variables for the two 
genders. By 2005, the gap between the predicted values is 14 percentage points (the actual gap is 15 
percentage points) but the gap between the pooled-coefficient female and male predictions is only 7 
percentage points. Thus behavioral differences which are neutralized when using the pooled-coefficient 
predictions explain half the predicted gap and the remaining 7 point gap is entirely due to differences in 
the average values of the female and male characteristics. The only variable in Tables 7 and 9 that is 
gender-specific and can change through time (except for differences that may arise for compositional 
reasons and by chance) is the University Premium. Thus, as in the previous sub-section, the University 
Premium emerges as a variable to which particular attention should be paid. Nevertheless, Figures 2 and 
3 provide a more detailed characterization of the temporal aspects of our results than section 4.1. 
Table 11 provides, for the first and last year in the sample, more details on these points and, in light 
of the importance of this variable, for all six variants of the University Premium. Table 11 relies on the 
Linear Probability model. In this table, columns 1 and 2 provide the actual values (solid lines in Figure 
1) and columns 3 and 4 the predicted values (solid lines in Figure 2) of the university participation rates 
of women and men. Column 5 shows the predicted participation gap between the genders (the 
                                                      
14 Note that the Logit model’s formulae have been used to generate all Logit predictions (whether based on the 
own or pooled coefficients) appearing in this paper.   22
difference between the solid lines in Figure 2). Columns 6 and 7 indicate the female and male 
participation rates that are predicted by the pooled coefficient estimates from column 5, Table 7. 
Column 8, Table 11, notes the distance between them (the distance between the broken lines in Figure 
2). As already noted, this distance is entirely due to gender-conditioned differences in the average 
values of variables or characteristics. Since University Premium is in fact the only gender-conditioned 
variable, column 9 in Table 11 provides the difference between the female and male values of 
University Premium for each of the six variants explored in Table 6. Column 10 contains the coefficient 
on University Premium in the pooled equations for each of the six definitions of this variable. Column 
11, which is the product of the difference between the female and male values of University Premium 
and the pooled coefficient on the University Premium, provides the part of the characteristics 
contribution (in column 8, Table 11) that can be explained by the University Premium itself. As can be 
seen by comparing the values in columns 11 and 8, Table 11, these are very close. That is, allowing for 
random differences in the average values of female and male characteristics as well as rounding, the 
difference in the University Premium for females and males is responsible for just about all the portion 
(i.e. column 8) that is due to characteristics. An alternative way to view the results that is more 
convenient for the Logit model below is that the sum of the figures in Columns (11) and (7) should 
produce something close to the female pooled coefficient predictions in column (6), all in Table 11; this 
is indeed the case.  
An additional point in Table 11 is that the percentage point contribution of characteristics depends 
on the definition of the University Premium in a way that mirrors the decompositions in Table 10. As 
the definition shifts to longer, later and more coincident earning horizons and to the moving average 
over three years, the role of characteristics increases. That is, the numbers in column 11, Table 11, 
generally increase as we move downward. This is also the message in Table 10 and, in this sense, the 
decompositions in sections 4.1 and 4.2 are in agreement. 
Table 12 provides a similar analysis for the Logit model. In this context, it is necessary to add the 
amounts in column 11 to the Index values that generated the male predictions in column 7 and then 
generate the predictions that appear in column 12 of that table. These should be close to the predictions   23
for females in column 6, as is indeed the case. As in Table 11, the role of characteristics increases as the 
definition of the University Premium changes form annual to the three-year average and as the 
averaging window becomes longer and more coincident. 
These findings enrich the picture supplied by the decompositions in section 4.1. The gap in the 
participation rates between women and men can be shown to be due to two forces: (i) Gender 
conditioned, individually small, differences in the coefficients that combine to explain about half of the 
15 actual percentage point divergence that opened up by 2005 between the female and male 
participation rates and (ii) the difference between the values of the University Premium for women and 
men which explains the remaining half of the 2005 gender participation gap. 
Until now, we have focused on the increase in the university participation gap between women and 
men. Doing so shifts attention away from the forces that shape the two participation rates in their own 
right (albeit differentially) over time. To redress that omission, we now describe how the overall 
predictions (the solid lines in Figures 2 and 3) are shaped by the regressors. This analysis is more 
lucidly carried out using the Linear Probability model. The predictions for women and men are 
constructed from ‘time-invariant’ regressors (such as the intercept, Children, Urban A and B, and 
Province) which, while they may change at random, do no have a strong time dimension and 
‘time-varying’ regressors (such as Tuition, Income, parental education, University premium and Trend). 
Table 13 provides details, first for females and then for males, using the coefficients in Table 7; all 
numbers are in percentage points.  
We first look at the part of Table 13 that deals with the predictions for women. The predicted values 
for 1977 and 2005 were 0.13 and 0.39 respectively (c.f. Table 11). In these same years, the overall 
contribution of the time-invariant regressors was -0.23 and -0.27 points respectively. Of the 
time-varying regressors, Trend contributed 0.01 points (1 times the coefficient of 0.0060979 in Table 7, 
rounded up) in 1977 and 0.18 points in 2005 (29 times 0.0060979 rounded up) for a difference of 0.17 
points. These effects capture the influence of socioeconomic variables that cannot be modeled explicitly; 
however, doing so allows for a more accurate assessment of the role of other time-varying regressors. 
The parental education variables were the next most important factors. Note that the contribution of the   24
Head in single-parent households increased from 0.07 in 1977 to 0.13 in 2005 for a difference of 0.06 
points. That is, the increase in educational attainment of Heads noted in section 3 over this period 
encouraged additional university participation equal to 6 percentage points. For couple-based 
households, the influence of the Head is lower (as per the negative coefficients in column 1, Table 7) but 
there is now the positive influence of the Spouse as well which contributes 0.02 in 1977 and 0.05 in 
2005 for a difference of 0.03 points. The couple-based intercept contributes 0.02 points in both years 
(see column 1, Table 7). Thus parental forces increase university participation over time because 
parents become more educated, thereby encouraging more children to go to university. This influence is 
stronger in couple-based than single-parent households. To the best of our knowledge, these dynamic 
effects have never been quantified. The University Premium contributes 0.25 points in 1977 and 0.31 
points in 2005 for an increase of 0.06 points. This is an important effect but smaller in quantitative 
importance than Trend and equal to the Head effect for single-parent households. It must be emphasized 
that, while this variable is third in rank (after Trend and the group of parental variables) in terms of 
contributing to the growth of the participation rate, it is nevertheless the only gender-conditioned 
variable which can account for the differential growth in the participation rate between women and men. 
Table 13 shows that Tuition exerted an increasingly depressing effect; it moderated the growth in the 
participation rate by 0.03 points between 1977 and 2005. Finally, the growth in real income (Income 
and Income2) increased the participation rate by 0.02 points. The effects of Tuition and real income are 
smaller than those of Trend, parental education and the University Premium. 
The lower part of Table 13 provides the same analysis for men. The noteworthy difference is that 
the impact of the growth in the time-varying regressors is smaller, leading to smaller increases in 
predicted participation rates and a growing gap between the predictions for women and men. Note that 
the dynamic effects of parental education are smaller for males than females. 
This analysis in this section complements and completes the average decompositions over the 
whole time period presented in the section 4.1. The average gap between the participation rates for 
women and men is indeed mostly due to differences in the University Premium. But this evaluation 
understates the role of Trend and the parental education variables in increasing the participation rate   25
over time. The University Premium remains an important, albeit no longer the sole, force acting on the 
participation rate and it is the only force (beyond differences in coefficients) that can explain the 
increasing gap between the female and male participation rates. 
4.3 Independent Households 
For a variety of reasons, a number of young women and men aged 18-24 set up independent 
households, away from their parents. Since these individuals will not have children of their own aged 
18-24, they are not captured in the sample that we have been examining so far. Nevertheless, they are 
likely to be engaged in the same decision processes as the young persons in our main sample and it is 
important to examine their behavior. 
  Doing so is challenging. To begin with, it is not clear how the parents of children in independent 
households respond to questions when surveyed. Depending on the live-away arrangements of the 
children and a host of other considerations, parents may still declare children as ‘at home’. To the extent 
that this always happens, then our work above, while ignoring the fact that some children live 
independently and may be influenced by further considerations, nevertheless takes these individual 
observations into account. If this never happens, then what we have done so far is (except for the 
possibility of some sample selection issues being present) appropriate but it would be interesting to also 
consider the behavior of the independents.  
An obstacle in proceeding is that the family background and circumstances (e.g. Income, Children, 
Head and Spouse educational attainment and area of residence) of an individual living independently is 
difficult to ascertain in many data sets. For example, including family variables in the data set for 
independents is not possible in the case of independent cross-sections such as the SCFs. However, the 
longitudinal nature of SLID makes it possible to connect (through the person identifiers and with some 
loss of information in the earliest years) young persons in independent households with their original 
families and to attach to the data set for these young persons the same family characteristics that we 
were able to include in Tables 7 and 9.
15 It is possible to analyze 8258 observations (4475 women and 
                                                      
15 Thus, for the independents, Children and Income refer to the latest relevant value of these variables for the 
original family. Tuition and province were determined by the province of residence of the independent household.    26
3783 men) on independents
16 on the same basis as was done in earlier sections. This group can be 
compared to the 26604 young persons (12677 women and 13927 men), drawn from SLID, and included 
in the work of the earlier sections. This is a first stab at this problem with samples which are restricted to 
a very much shorter period and, especially when analyzed by gender, are relatively small. 
  We began by estimating separate Linear Probability and Logit equations for those living 
independently and at home, by gender. These equations are structurally distinct both when compared by 
gender and when compared by whether individuals are living independently or with parents. In this 
short period of time, the time-varying regressors (Tuition, University Premium and Trend) generally 
lose their usefulness with an important exception in the equations for females. The Linear Probability 
and Logit models for females living independently and with parents have positive coefficients for Trend 
which are statistically significant. This effect is stronger for women living independently. The parental 
educational attainment variables are considerably weaker, particularly for the small samples of women 
and men living independently. However, having a parent with a degree is always a positive, statistically 
significant, influence and it appears that the quantitative importance of the Head having a degree 
exceeds that of the Spouse.
17 Income and Children and their squares behave as in Tables 7 and 9, while 
some provincial effects continue to be important. These results are not reported in detail. 
  Having examined how far the sample can be explored in its most appropriate and disaggregated 
form, we then considered less ambitious specifications. In Tables 14 and 15, we report, for the Linear 
probability and Logit models respectively, specifications parallel to those in the rightmost columns of 
Tables 7 and 9 (pooled, with female dummy) but for the feasible SLID period, broken down by whether 
individuals live independently or with parents. While the equations are structurally distinct, the general 
conclusions drawn are qualitatively and, in many cases, quantitatively similar. The period is too short 
                                                      
16 More women than men are inclined to live independently. Card and Lemieux (1997, p.10) note that ‘In both 
Canada and the US, young women are less likely to live with parents and more likely to head their own families 
than young men. In part this reflects the difference in average age at marriage … In addition, the much higher 
fraction of women who head their own single-parent family contributes to the male-female gap in living 
arrangements.’ For Australia, see Cobb-Clark (2008). Here, we assume that living arrangements are exogenous. 
17 The only exception is the case of males living independently in the Linear Probability model and then only once 
the additional spouse effect is taken into account.   27
for any of the equations to pick up effects from Tuition and the University Premium, though the latter 
reasserts itself when Female is excluded and economic variables are forced to pick up the slack. Even 
Trend is considerably weakened. It is, however, statistically significant in the leftmost columns of 
Tables 14 and 15 where all children are considered. It is also significant in the equations for those living 
independently, echoing the result noted in the previous paragraph. Income and Children have the 
familiar positive, but at a decreasing rate, influence on the probability of attending university. The 
coefficients on Urban A and B are generally higher for those living independently. The educational 
attainment variables are clearest in the case of Degree and quantitatively stronger for those living at 
home. As in the case of the main general results in section 4.1, the propensity to attend university is 
higher in the maritime and prairie provinces than is the case in the omitted category of British 
Columbia.  
In short, the results in this sub-section suggest that, notwithstanding the statistical distinctness of 
the two groups, the probability of attending university by individuals living independently is shaped by 
the same forces and in generally similar ways as that for individuals living at home. 
5. Conclusion 
In Canada, females now have a larger share than males in university enrolments. We used the 
master files of SCF (1977-1997) and SLID (1998-2005) to investigate the forces that shape university 
participation as well as the imbalance between the genders in Canada. The Master Files have to be used 
physically in designated Statistics Canada Data Resource Centres and results obtained must be 
approved and released. These features make it difficult and time consuming to process the available 
information. On the other hand, the Master Files offer several advantages. To begin with, it is possible 
to establish the gender of each child in an economic family and to treat these individuals as the unit of 
analysis. Secondly, it is possible to establish whether a child in an economic family attended college or 
university (rather than simply tertiary education), thus making it possible to focus on university 
participation rates where the divergence between the participation of females and males has occurred - 
college participation rates for women and men are very similar. While the individual female and male 
children can be the unit of analysis, it is nevertheless useful to attach to each child important family   28
characteristics such as income and the education of the Head and Spouse in the family. In addition, it is 
possible to minimize the seam between the SCF and the SLID by adopting the SCF convention 
regarding the definition of the household Head in the SLID period. Finally, using the panel structure of 
SLID, we were able to connect young adults living in their own independent households with their 
families of origin, thus attaching to them information on important family variables; this made it 
possible to begin a comparison of the determinants of university participation for individuals living at 
home and those in independent households. These refinements are not possible when Public Use Files 
are used. In addition to data from the SCF and SLID, we also include information on Tuition fees and 
several definitions of the University Premium and consider the role of these forces on the decision to 
attend university. We do so while allowing for broad socioeconomic secular forces that increase 
university attendance but are impossible to disentangle.  
Participation rates were estimated using both the Linear Probability and Logit models, thus 
conducting a useful robustness check on our results. The predictive power of these models is high and 
both predict the increasing participation rates for women and men, as well as the increasing gap 
between the two, satisfactorily. The results obtained were analyzed using decomposition techniques 
suitable to both linear and non-linear models and looking at experience when averaged over the entire 
sample period and at each point in time. The whole-sample decompositions of the role of variables and 
coefficients indicate that differences between women and men are on average due to both differences in 
variables (notably the University Premium) and coefficients, with the mix between them tilting much 
more towards variables as the University Premium definition shifts to longer, more coincident, earning 
horizons and the three year moving average definition. Looking at the growth in the participation rates 
for women and men through time, the 15 percentage point actual gap in the participation rates that 
opened up by 2005 can be explained approximately equally by differences in the coefficients on the 
variables entering the female and male equations and by gender differences in the value of the 
University Premium. As with the whole-sample decompositions, the moving average definitions of the 
University Premium tend to suggest that a higher proportion of the participation gap can be explained 
by differences in variables than is the case with the annual and shorter horizon definitions. The   29
predicted values of the female and male participation rates grow over time to reflect the broad influence 
of socioeconomic trends but also the increasing importance of parental education: As parents become 
more educated, their children are more likely to go to university. We provide what may be the first 
quantitative estimates of this long-run dynamic. The University Premium remains an important secular 
force on the predicted participation rates and it is about as important quantitatively as the parental 
effects. In this long period that we were able to examine in a consistent manner, tuition fee increases 
undoubtedly moderated the growth in university attendance. This effect, which can only be picked up 
over long periods, is weaker quantitatively than that of the University Premium. The growth in real 
income does stimulate university attendance, as might be expected, but this force is less powerful than 
any of the other secular forces just mentioned. 
The increasing gender imbalance in university attendance reflects, to an extent, the difference in 
the returns to a university education for the different genders. As the supply of highly educated women 
rises relative to that of men, a natural equilibrating process may occur and the difference in 
post-secondary attendance rates may stabilize. Among those without a post-secondary education, men 
(on average) earn more than women. This difference is at least somewhat offset by the increasing 
relative education levels of women. Thus, the higher post-secondary attendance rate of women may not 
be something that should be rectified through programs that promote more male versus female 
post-secondary attendance. In fact, through simulation exercises, Shannon and Kidd (2001) note that, 
although the higher rate of university participation (in Canada) by women may help redress the overall 
imbalance in male-female earnings, they project that the overall earnings advantage of males is unlikely 
to be eliminated within the next three decades. 
Others have suggested possible problems arising from this gap, such as the difficulty that highly 
educated women will have in marrying men of equally high education levels (e.g., see Evers, Livernois, 
and Mancuso (2004)). However, it is not clear that there is any role for policy in removing this cause of 
this imbalance (i.e., the higher returns for women) or to subsidize more highly the cost of education for 
males.   30
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Table 1 
The Proportion of Females and Males at University and College (1977-2005) 
 
Year  Females at University  Males at University  Females at College  Males at College 
1979 0.12    0.10  0.14  0.11 
1984 0.17    0.13  0.15  0.12 
1988 0.21    0.18  0.18  0.13 
1994 0.28    0.19  0.20  0.15 
1999 0.33    0.23  0.24  0.22 
2005 0.41  0.26  0.21  0.20 
Source: SCF and SLID, various years. A number such as 0.12 for Females at University in 1979 indicates that of all female children 




Proportion of Females Between 18-24 at University by Income Quintile
 
        Family Income Quintiles 
Year     First  Second  Third  Fourth Fifth 
1979   0.09  0.09  0.12  0.15  0.14 
1984   0.07  0.11  0.14  0.21  0.28 
1988   0.13  0.17  0.21  0.18  0.35 
1994   0.18  0.22  0.26  0.29  0.42 
1999     0.24  0.28  0.31  0.34 0.46 
2005   0.30  0.32  0.40  0.45  0.59 
Source: SCF and SLID, various years. A number such as 0.09 for the first quintile in 1979 indicates that the proportion of female 




Proportion of Males Between 18-24 at University by Income Quintile
 
      Family Income Quintiles 
Year      First Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth 
1979   0.07  0.08  0.12  0.12  0.11 
1984   0.06  0.07  0.10  0.15  0.29 
1988   0.11  0.14  0.14  0.22  0.29 
1994   0.12  0.16  0.17  0.20  0.29 
1999     0.17  0.20  0.20  0.19  0.37 
2005   0.13  0.29  0.22  0.28  0.39 
Source: SCF and SLID, various years. A number such as 0.07 for the first quintile in 1979 indicates that the proportion of male 
children attending university was on average equal to 0.07. 
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Table 4 
Proportion of Females Between 18-24 at University by Income Group (1992 Constant Dollars) 
 
  Year 
Income Range ($)  1979  1984  1988  1994  1999  2005 
0-20,000  0.09 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.31  0.30 
20,001-30,000  0.08 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.22  0.31 
30,001-40,000  0.11 0.14 0.21 0.25 0.31  0.30 
40,001-50,000  0.16 0.16 0.19 0.24 0.28  0.34 
50,001-60,000  0.13 0.27 0.25 0.35 0.30  0.50 
60,001-70,000  0.15 0.20 0.30 0.32 0.39  0.43 
70,001-80,000  0.16 0.24 0.40 0.60 0.40  0.48 
80,000+  0.12 0.43 0.37 0.45 0.55  0.63 




Proportion of Males Between 18-24 at University by Income Group (1992 constant dollars) 
 
  Year 
Income Range ($)  1979  1984  1988  1994  1999  2005 
0-20,000  0.07 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.18  0.09 
20,001-30,000  0.09 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.18  0.18 
30,001-40,000  0.08 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.21  0.33 
40,001-50,000  0.13 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.19  0.21 
50,001-60,000  0.11 0.19 0.27 0.21 0.19  0.22 
60,001-70,000  0.12 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.23  0.32 
70,001-80,000  0.09 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.32  0.31 
80,000+  0.15 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.49  0.42 
Source: SCF and SLID, various years. 
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Table 6 
Three Definitions of University Premium by Gender: Annual Version and Moving Average Version 
 
  Annual Version    Three-Year Moving Average Version 
  Age  (25-29)/(19-23)  Age  (25-34)/(19-28)  Age  (25-34)/(25-34)    Age (25-29)/(19-23)    Age (25-34)/(19-28)  Age  (25-34)/(25-34) 
Year  Female Male    Female Male    Female Male    Female Male    Female Male    Female Male 
1977  1.96  1.68   1.89  1.55   1.68  1.25    1.89  1.64   1.82  1.56   1.61  1.24 
1979  1.86  1.63   1.80  1.56   1.66  1.25    1.90  1.63   1.83  1.55   1.69  1.21 
1981  1.84  1.65   1.82  1.59   1.62  1.27    1.84  1.65   1.78  1.59   1.59  1.25 
1982  2.10  1.84   1.87  1.53   1.64  1.20    1.92  1.72   1.80  1.58   1.59  1.24 
1984  2.14  2.01   1.93  1.66   1.67  1.25    2.11  1.95   1.91  1.68   1.66  1.27 
1985  2.34  1.95   1.94  1.74   1.65  1.29    2.19  2.00   1.93  1.75   1.67  1.30 
1986  2.19  1.97   1.97  1.70   1.58  1.27    2.22  1.98   1.95  1.70   1.63  1.27 
1987  2.14  1.89   1.93  1.64   1.57  1.25    2.23  1.94   1.94  1.69   1.60  1.27 
1988  2.21  1.78   2.06  1.64   1.70  1.21    2.18  1.88   1.99  1.66   1.62  1.24 
1989  2.30  2.12   2.15  1.73   1.73  1.27    2.22  1.93   2.05  1.67   1.67  1.24 
1990  2.46  2.02   2.20  1.78   1.75  1.28    2.32  1.97   2.14  1.72   1.73  1.25 
1991  2.56  2.40   2.17  1.97   1.70  1.34    2.44  2.18   2.17  1.83   1.73  1.30 
1992  2.55  2.45   2.32  1.97   1.80  1.39    2.48  2.30   2.23  1.91   1.75  1.34 
1993  2.95  2.36   2.59  2.02   1.83  1.35    2.65  2.41   2.36  1.99   1.78  1.36 
1994  2.79  2.25   2.22  1.93   1.65  1.35    2.75  2.36   2.37  1.97   1.76  1.37 
1995  2.60  2.15   2.52  1.96   1.76  1.31    2.78  2.25   2.44  1.97   1.75  1.34 
1996  2.72  2.13   2.28  1.76   1.90  1.20    2.65  2.18   2.34  1.88   1.77  1.29 
1997  2.84  2.23   2.63  1.93   1.80  1.36    2.65  2.17   2.48  1.88   1.82  1.29 
1998  2.79  1.96   2.65  1.94   1.84  1.44    2.72  2.11   2.52  1.87   1.85  1.33 
1999  2.70  1.93   2.31  1.93   1.74  1.36    2.75  2.04   2.53  1.93   1.79  1.39 
2000  2.37  2.07   2.48  2.04   2.00  1.44    2.60  1.99   2.48  1.97   1.86  1.41 
2001  2.53  2.01   2.50  2.07   1.92  1.49    2.51  2.00   2.43  2.02   1.88  1.43 
2002  2.49  2.17   2.26  1.99   1.95  1.43    2.46  2.08   2.41  2.04   1.96  1.45 
2003  3.04  2.26   2.55  2.18   1.91  1.50    2.69  2.15   2.44  2.08   1.93  1.47 
2004  2.77  2.36   2.65  2.13   2.02  1.51    2.77  2.27   2.48  2.10   1.96  1.48 
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Table 7 
Linear Probability Determinants of University Attendance: Female, Male and Pooled Results (1977-2005; sample weights used) 
 
   Females    Males   
Pooled Sample 
( no female dummy)   
Pooled Sample 
(female dummy) 
Variable     Coefficient  Coef/se  Coefficient    Coef/se   Coefficient  Coef/se   Coefficient  Coef/se 
Tuition    -0.0000199  -2.33   -0.0000167  -2.39   -0.0000186  -5.01   -0.0000170  -3.14 
Income    1.04E-06  7.63   1.05E-06  8.63   1.04E-06  20.10   1.04E-06  11.13 
Income 2    -4.77E-13  -4.91    -7.73E-13  -6.61   -6.41E-13  -10.65   -6.41E-13  -5.14 
Children    0.0614081  4.95   0.0653865  6.70   0.064441  10.80   0.0644132  8.33 
Children  2    -0.0098714  -3.41   -0.0130771  -5.89   -0.0118147  -8.13   -0.0118232  -6-64 
Urban  A    0.0260031  3.43   0.0338630  5.70   0.0298078  7.01   0.0297369  6.31 
Urban  B    0.0502279  9.97   0.0683330  17.82   0.0600659  23.71   0.0599055  19.43 
Education                     
Single  Parents:  head                      
High  School    0.0610732  4.66   0.0369246  3.87   0.0476972  6.86   0.0474613  6.07 
Some  Postsec.    0.0976347  4.20   0.0750185  4.20   0.0840190  8.16   0.0836992  5.81 
Postsec.  Dipl.    0.1088165  7.27   0.0540354  4.70   0.0793016  10.94   0.0788444  8.50 
Degree    0.2961827  12.94   0.2079438  10.36   0.2495233  27.45   0.2489971  16.43 
Couples:  add.  head  effect                      
Intercept    0.0202224  2.09   0.0053340  0.75   0.0119266  2.14   0.0118386  2.04 
High  School    -0.0135416  -0.91   0.0074378  0.68   -0.0020083  -0.26   -0.0019093  -0.21 
Some  Postsec.    -0.0312701  -1.18   -0.0379215  -1.87   -0.0354849  -3.06   -0.0351947  -2.16 
Postsec.  Dipl.    -0.0514525  -3.05   -0.0065263  -0.51   -0.0281605  -3.49   -0.0277442  -2.66 
Degree    -0.0810500  -3.22   -0.0148570  -0.68   -0.0469392  -4.68   -0.0465174  -2.80 
Couples:  spouse  effect                      
High  School    0.0278135  3.87   0.0173897  3.16   0.0221024  6.56   0.0219947  4.99 
Some  Postsec.    0.0766240  5.81   0.0260692  2.61   0.0485650  8.95   0.0483748  5.97 
Postsec.  Dipl.    0.0643379  7.35   0.0578851  8.36   0.0612938  15.87   0.0612343  11.22 
Degree    0.1577894  11.30   0.1384067  11.27   0.1479265  27.68   0.1478312  16.03 
Province                     
Newfoundland    -0.0029532  -0.15   0.0059060  0.46   -0.0096496  -1.20   0.0119421  1.17 
Prince  Ed.  Isl.    0.1356544  9.76   0.0813480  6.60   0.1025282  6.76   0.1092517  12.21 
Nova  Scotia    0.0703252  5.34   0.0610942  6.17   0.0612371  8.31   0.0680202  8.63 
New  Brunswick    0.0877716  6.76   0.0727207  7.46   0.0745327  9.92   0.0838111  10.97 
Quebec    0.0074232  0.65   -0.0168796  -1.72   -0.0092436  -2.12   -0.0028698  -0.40 
Ontario    0.0344830  3.72   0.0177559  2.27   0.0236430  6.03   0.0271559  4.57 
Manitoba    0.0653813  5.36   0.0665714  6.87   0.0644610  9.87   0.0679114  8.96 
Saskatchewan    0.0493094  3.98   0.0708657  7.83   0.0604766  8.29   0.0654716  9.01 
Alberta    -0.0103200  -0.92   0.0083104  0.95   -0.0014732  -0.29   0.0020559  0.30 
Female   n/a  n/a    n/a  n/a    n/a  n/a    0.0169434  2.80 
Univ.  Premium    0.1545524  7.65   0.1656373  6.55   0.1781319  33.32   0.1415168  10.41 
Time  Trend    0.0060979  10.37   0.0023657  4.83   0.0038825  13.49   0.0039711  10.50 
S    0.0196674  1.84   -0.0006521  -0.07   0.0091324  2.02   0.0107282  1.56 
Constant    -0.3599068  -11.13   -0.2920843  -9.68   -0.3428998  -31.35   -0.3064269  -17.15 
Number  of  obs.      57109     74131     131240     131240 
R  Squared      0.1124     0.0958     0.1090     0.1091 
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Table 8 





Fairlie Decomposition Switching 
From Female to Male   
Fairlie Decomposition Switching 
From Male to Female 
   
Female Male  None 
 
Female   Male  None 
Female's Participation Rate  0.2558    0.2558 0.2558  0.2558    0.2558 0.2558  0.2558 
Male's Participation Rate  0.1784    0.1784 0.1784  0.1784    0.1784   0.1784   0.1784 
Gender Imbalance  0.0774    0.0774 0.0774  0.0774    0.0774   0.0774   0.0774 
              
Difference Due to Tuition   -0.0011    -0.0037 -0.0025  -0.0018    -0.0012   -0.0003   -0.0006 
Percentage Due to Tuition  -1.36%    -4.78% -3.17%  -2.35%    -1.54% -0.38%  -0.83% 
Standard Error  0.00021    0.00004 0.00003  0.00078    4.1E-6 5.8E-6  0.00007 
              
Difference Due to Income and Income 2  0.0011    0.0023 0.0004  0.0008    0.0032   0.0016  0.0030 
Percentage Due to Income and Income 2   1.49%    2.92% 0.58%  1.01%    4.19% 2.12%  3.86% 
Standard Error  0.00006    6.9E-6 2.2E-6  0.00006    0.00001 5.5E-6  0.00015 
              
Difference Due to University Premium  0.0631    0.0615 0.0744  0.0615    0.0559   0.0699   0.0565 
Percentage Due to University Premium  81.56%    79.49% 96.1%  79.46%    72.18% 90.29%  72.98% 
Standard Error  0.00189    0.00011 0.00013  0.00189    0.00010 0.00012  0.00171 
              
Difference Due to All Characteristics  0.0733    0.0799 0.0823  0.0708    0.0799 0.0823  0.0708 
Percentage Due to All Characteristics 94.69%    103.27% 106.37%  91.5%   103.27% 106.37%  91.5% 
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Table 9 
Logit Determinants of University Attendance: Female, Male and Pooled Results (1977-2005; sample weights used) 
 
 Female     Male      Pooled (No Female Dummy)      Pooled (Female Dummy included) 
Variable Coef.  Coef/se  Marg.  Effect   Coef. Coef/se  Marg.  Effect   Coef. Coef/se  Marg.  Effect    Coef. Coef/se  Marg.  Effect
Tuition -0.0001767  -3.42 -0.0000117   -0.0001413 -2.65 -5.79E-06   -0.0001658 -4.53 -8.68E-06   -0.0001503 -4.06 -7.03E-06
Income 5.27E-06  7.19 3.48E-07   6.05E-06 8.48 2.48E-07   5.68E-06 11.16 2.98E-07   5.70E-06 11.20 2.67E-07
Income 2  -2.07E-12  -2.74 -1.37E-13   -4.66E-12 -5.67 -1.91E-13   -3.68E-12 -6.34 -1.93E-13   -3.69E-12 -6.49 -1.73E-13
Children 0.3767412  4.40 0.0248771   0.5761560 6.08 0.0236160   0.4732008 7.45 0.0247750   0.4719055 7.42 0.0220877
Children 2  -0.0633471  -2.96 -0.0041830   -0.1233007 -5.10 -0.0050540   -0.0919830 -5.74 -0.0048159   -0.0918830 -5.74 -0.0043006
Urban A  0.1724363  3.66 0.0122630   0.3211745 6.59 0.0152766   0.2424843 7.18 0.0141519   0.2413713 7.16 0.0126081
Urban B  0.3202448  10.23 0.0242736   0.5797270 18.05 0.0311510   0.4476987 20.04 0.0286686   0.4455510 19.95 0.0255676
Education                              
Single Parents: head         
High School  0.6072919  4.75 0.0520744   0.5824132 4.40 0.0313352   0.6033798 6.56 0.0414625   0.6010696 6.54 0.0370671
Some Postsec.  0.8796876  5.35 0.0846318   0.9371017 5.55 0.0596711   0.9121745 7.75 0.0720475   0.9088292 7.73 0.0646251
Postsec. Dipl.  0.9495361  7.85 0.0940371   0.7700033 5.67 0.0452887   0.8837381 9.83 0.0689180   0.8790802 9.78 0.0616580
Degree 1.8184980  13.59 0.2493797   1.7011610 12.07 0.1540812   1.7682310 18.29 0.2004685   1.7634250 18.24 0.1827148
Couples: add head effect         
Intercept 0.3292985  3.05 0.0250575 0.2705141 2.33 0.0125656 0.3053657 3.86 0.0183346 0.3043269 3.84 0.0163627
High School  -0.2591774  -1.89 -0.0153248   -0.1299512 -0.92 -0.0050212   -0.2007914 -2.04 -0.0096215   -0.1997136 -2.03 -0.0085496
Some Postsec.  -0.4246182  -2.38 -0.0234220   -0.5316215 -2.90 -0.0172056   -0.4876547 -3.81 -0.0206478   -0.4843924 -3.79 -0.0183161
Postsec. Dipl.  -0.5470512  -4.19 -0.0286816   -0.2958376 -2.04 -0.0106133   -0.4472871 -4.64 0.0192669   -0.4430051 -4.59 -0.0170519
Degree -0.7228357  -5.00 -0.0352723   -0.5170937 -3.42 -0.0168404   -0.6317613 -6.07 0.0251744   -0.6271592 -6.03 -0.0223182
Couples: spouse effect         
High School  0.2161986  4.35 0.0156680   0.2048300 3.96 0.0092276   0.2115484 5.91 0.0121756   0.2107579 5.89 0.0108558
Some Postsec.  0.4701026  6.61 0.0380083   0.2718594 3.73 0.0126360   0.3742205 7.36 0.0231792   0.3724107 7.33 0.0206610
Postsec. Dipl.  0.4006233  7.65 0.0314366   0.4724941 8.73 0.0241327   0.4385273 11.67 0.0279649   0.4375672 11.64 0.0250170
Degree 0.7759056  11.24 0.0714697   0.7863985 11.36 0.0466149   0.7846000 16.08 0.0585192   0.7836485 16.06 0.0525928
Province                              
Newfoundland 0.0627180  0.53 0.0042545   0.0698174 0.67 0.0029549   -0.1147136 -1.97 -0.0057086   0.1355129 1.87 0.0067444
Prince Edward Island  0.8515727  10.68 0.0809712   0.7110633 8.01 0.0406665   0.7418157 13.14 0.0542704   0.8078691 14.06 0.0548294
Nova Scotia  0.5015947  6.13 0.0411070   0.4890420 6.17 0.0251740   0.4321715 7.79 0.0274803   0.5087324 9.01 0.0300591
New Brunswick  0.5883189  7.60 0.0500401   0.5894787 7.82 0.0318218   0.5152304 10.34 0.0340185   0.6153987 11.74 0.0382036
Quebec 0.0325852  0.48 0.0021820   -0.1302272 -1.80 -0.0050312   -0.0820854 -1.76 -0.0041441   -0.0229763 -0.48 -0.0010643
Ontario 0.2502613  4.29 0.0184050   0.1611435 2.65 0.0071138   0.1855200 4.48 0.0105533   0.2199603 5.28 0.0113776
Manitoba 0.3826296  5.44 0.0297928   0.4743263 6.93 0.0242473   0.4045157 8.38 0.0254016   0.4391300 9.00 0.0251245
Saskatchewan 0.3291535  4.52 0.0250449   0.5308633 8.02 0.0278727   0.3961657 8.30 0.0247834   0.4495624 9.25 0.0258457
Alberta -0.0205627  -0.30 -0.0013459   0.0675350 1.02 0.0028553   -0.0093071 -0.20 -0.0004853   0.0297980 0.63 0.0014136
Female n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a   0.1729961 4.57 0.0087583
University Premium  0.7700477  6.93 0.0508481   1.0576700 6.00 0.0433528   1.1232410 24.39 0.0588087   0.7585529 9.34 0.0355043
Time Trend  0.0448547  10.99 0.0029619   0.0222393 5.22 0.0009116   0.0324313 11.03 0.0016980   0.0335626 11.34 0.0015709
S 0.0653028  1.12 0.0044347   -0.0253875 -0.41 -0.0010286   0.0165667 0.39 0.0008738   0.0324493 0.77 0.0015412
Constant -4.8480430  -23.84     -5.3423280 -22.09     -5.3668770 -45.00     -5.0087530 -37.86  
Number of obs.    57109 74131 131240 131240
Log Likelihood    -29304       -31439       -60950       -60932  




Percentage of Gender Participation Gap Explained by University Premium 
             
  Annual Version    Three-Year Moving Average Version 
 (25-29)/(19-23)  (25-34)/(19-28)  (25-34)/(25-34)   (25-29)/(19-23)  (25-34)/(19-28)  (25-34)/(25-34) 
LINEAR PROBABILITY               
Without Female Dummy  28.53 43.00  64.39   42.75  66.59  81.56 
With Female Dummy  12.00 18.92  30.62   19.21  41.69  64.79 
              
LOGIT             
Without Female Dummy             
Female to Male               
Female Weight  30.53  44.00  61.68    46.40  71.58  79.49 
Male Weight  37.97  54.38  75.28    56.93  86.40  96.10 
No Weight  32.00  45.87  62.57    50.83  72.15  79.46 
Male to Female               
Female Weight  4.28  33.00  55.19    33.23  54.22  72.18 
Male Weight  1.75  44.16  70.74    43.77  68.92  90.29 
No Weight  4.20  35.19  57.35    35.88  54.73  72.98 
              
With Female Dummy             
Female to Male               
Female Weight  10.21  16.06  23.35    17.01  37.73  51.84 
Male Weight  12.41  18.76  27.73    19.98  44.96  62.10 
No Weight  11.61  18.39  23.89    20.63  37.93  44.56 
Male to Female               
Female Weight  7.49  12.00  20.59    12.02  27.92  46.68 
Male Weight  10.17  15.17  26.31    15.69  35.59  58.52 
No Weight  8.67  14.11  21.98    14.81  28.64  41.06 
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Table 11 
Linear Probability Participation Rates and Their Temporal Decomposition
                  
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
  Actual Fem.  Actual Male  Xfβf X mβm (3)-(4)  Xfβp X mβp (6)-(7)  Pf - Pm  βprem. (9)×(10) 
Annual Version                  
Age  (25-29)/(19-23)                  
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.12  0.11  0.01 0.14 0.11  0.03  .28 0.064339  0.02 
    2005  0.41  0.26  0.38  0.24  0.14  0.31  0.27  0.04  .64    0.04 
Age  (25-34)/(19-28)                  
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.12  0.11  0.01 0.15 0.10  0.05  .34 0.101913  0.04 
    2005 0.41 0.26 0.39 0.24 0.15 0.33 0.28 0.05 .36 0.04
Age  (25-34)/(25-34)                  
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.10  0.03 0.16 0.08  0.08  .43 0.140225  0.06 
    2005  0.41  0.26  0.39  0.25  0.14  0.35  0.29  0.06  .55    0.08 
Moving  Average Version                  
Age  (25-29)/(19-23)                  
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.12  0.11  0.01 0.14 0.11  0.03  .25 0.102378  0.03 
    2005  0.41  0.26  0.38  0.24  0.14  0.33  0.27  0.06  .61    0.06 
Age  (25-34)/(19-28)                  
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.12  0.11  0.01 0.14 0.10  0.04  .26 0.164427  0.04 
    2005  0.41  0.26  0.38  0.24  0.14  0.34  0.28  0.06  .42    0.07 
Age  (25-34)/(25-34)                  
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.11  0.02 0.16 0.08  0.08  .37 0.178132  0.07 
    2005  0.41  0.26  0.39  0.25  0.14  0.35  0.28  0.07  .49    0.09 
Notes: 
Col. 5: The gap between the female and male predicted participation rates using the own Linear Probability coefficients in columns 1 and 3, Table 7, respectively. 
Col. 6: The predictions of the female participation rate using the pooled linear probability coefficients in column 5, Table 7. 
Col. 7: The predictions of the male participation rate using the pooled linear probability coefficients in column .5, Table 7. 
Col. 8: The difference between the predicted female and male values using the pooled coefficients in column 5, Table 7. This amount must be due to differences in the values of 
variables. 
Col. 9: The difference between the female and male values of the University Premium in Table 6. 
Col. 10: The coefficient on University Premium in pooled equations such as that (for the Jacob, moving average definition) of column 5, Table 7. 
Col. 11: The contribution of University Premium to the gap in column 8 of this table that is due to differences in the variable values of the two genders. The sum of columns (7) and 
(11) should produce a figure that is close to the pooled female predictions in column (6). Remaining discrepancies are due to random differences in the yearly average values of other 
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Table 12 
Logit Participation Rates and Their Temporal Decomposition
      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  Actual Fem.  Actual Male Fem Pred Male Pred (3)-(4)  Fem Pool  Male Pool  (6)-(7)  Pf - Pm  βprem. (9)×(10)   
Annual Version    
Age (25-29)/(19-23)     
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.11  0.02  0.13 0.11  0.02  .28  0.394365  0.110422  0.12 
    2005  0.41  0.26  0.39  0.24  0.15  0.32  0.27  0.05  .64    0.252394  0.32 
Age (25-34)/(19-28)                         
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.11  0.02  0.14 0.11  0.03  .34  0.611423  0.207884  0.13 
    2005  0.41  0.26  0.40  0.25  0.15  0.34 0.29  0.05  .36    0.220112  0.34 
Age (25-34)/(25-34)                         
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.11  0.02  0.15 0.10  0.05  .43  0.868055  0.373264  0.14 
    2005  0.41  0.26  0.40  0.25  0.15  0.36  0.29  0.07  .55    0.47743  0.40 
Moving  Average Version                      
Age (25-29)/(19-23)                         
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.11  0.02  0.13 0.11  0.02  .25  0.636267  0.159067  0.13 
    2005  0.41  0.26  0.39  0.24  0.15  0.34  0.27  0.07  .61    0.388123  0.35 
Age (25-34)/(19-28)                         
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.11  0.02  0.14 0.11  0.03  .26  1.010846  0.26282  0.14 
    2005  0.41  0.26  0.39  0.25  0.14  0.35  0.28  0.07  .42    0.424555  0.37 
Age (25-34)/(25-34)                         
    1977  0.15  0.13  0.13  0.11  0.02  0.15 0.10  0.05  .37  1.123241  0.415599  0.14 
    2005  0.41  0.26  0.40  0.25  0.15  0.37  0.28  0.09  .49    0.550388  0.40 
Notes: 
Col. 5: The gap between the female and male predicted participation rates using the own Logit coefficients from columns 1 and 4, Table 9, respectively. 
Col. 6: The predictions of the female participation rate using the pooled Logit coefficients in column 7, Table 9. 
Col. 7: The predictions of the male participation rate using the pooled Logit coefficients in column 7, Table 9. 
Col. 8: The difference between the predicted female and male values using the pooled coefficients in column 7, Table 9. This amount must be due to differences in the values of 
variables. 
Col. 9: The difference between the female and male values of the University Premium in Table 6. 
Col. 10: The marginal effect of the University Premium from pooled equations such as that (for the Jacob, moving average definition) of column 7, Table 9. 
Col. 11: The product of the difference in the University Premium and the marginal effect. This amount is used to calculate the impact on the predicted values in column 12. 
Col. 12: This is obtained, using the prediction formulae for the Logit model, by adding the amounts in column (11) to the Index values that generated the male pooled predictions that 
appear in column (7) and recalculating. The ensuing probabilities should be close to the female pooled coefficient probability predictions in column (6). Remaining discrepancies 




The Influence of Time-Invariant and Time-Varying Regressors on Predicted Participation (in probability points)
                         
 Prediction    Time-Invariant    Time-Varying 
             Parental  Education        
         Trend    Single  Head Couple  Add  Head Couple-Spouse  Couple-Interc.    Premium  Tuition Income 
                          
Female                          
1977 0.13   -0.23    0.01    0.07  -0.02 0.02  0.02    0.25  -0.03  0.04 
2005 0.39   -0.27    0.18    0.13  -0.03 0.05  0.02    0.31  -0.06  0.06 
Difference 0.26    -0.04    0.17   0.06 -0.01  0.03  0.00    0.06  -0.03  0.02 
                          
Male                          
1977 0.11   -0.18    0.00    0.04  0.00 0.02  0.00    0.21  -0.02  0.04 
2005 0.25   -0.18    0.07    0.08  -0.01 0.04  0.00    0.25  -0.05  0.05 
Difference 0.14    0.00    0.07   0.04  -0.01 0.02  0.00    0.04  -0.03  0.01 
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Table 14 
Linear Probability Determinants of University Attendance: All Children, Living Independently, and Living at Home (SLID 1988-2005; sample weights used) 
 
 All  Children     Living  Independently     Living  at  Home 
Variable Coef.  Coef/se     Coef.  Coef/se     Coef.  Coef/se 
Tuition 4.08E-06 0.37   -0.0000187 -0.84   7.82E-06 0.61
Income 1.53E-06 15.25   1.86E-06 8.15   1.47E-06 12.54
Income 2  -1.03E-12 -9.30   -3.11E-12 -4.78   -9.64E-13 -8.03
Children 0.0849459 5.11   0.0831976 2.73   0.0930042 4.74
Children 2  -0.0165488 -3.68   -0.0228585 -2.80   -0.0157453 -2.97
Urban A  0.0322685 4.31   0.0408683 3.10   0.0412676 4.57
Urban B  0.0780292 15.58   0.1366287 14.48   0.0646650 10.94
Education              
Single Parents: head                 
High School  0.0297266 1.69   -0.0033634 -0.08   0.0454531 2.13
Some Postsec.  0.1280214 6.36   0.0584493 1.33   0.1476268 6.13
Postsec. Dipl.  0.0842606 5.87   0.0477136 1.85   0.1002410 5.43
Degree 0.2997757 16.09   0.2641995 5.61   0.3150211 14.12
Couples: add head effect                 
Intercept -0.0198768 -1.57 -0.0374456 -2.17 -0.0059921 -0.34
High School  0.0480249 2.48   0.0415841 0.94   0.0408015 1.74
Some Postsec.  -0.0475043 -2.11   0.0164074 0.34   -0.0649750 -2.42
Postsec. Dipl.  -0.0102970 -0.64   -0.0119323 -0.41   -0.0200663 -0.98
Degree -0.0649745 -3.15   -0.1098953 -2.18   -0.0702350 -2.85
Couples: spouse effect                 
High School  0.0305677 3.98   -0.0076848 -0.52   0.0389836 4.25
Some Postsec.  0.0400203 4.08   -0.0031839 -0.17   0.0494228 4.26
Postsec. Dipl.  0.0563945 7.78   0.0377451 2.79   0.0589272 6.74
Degree 0.1802170 17.71   0.1550800 7.58   0.1879129 15.81
Province              
Newfoundland 0.1672084 11.69   0.1313473 4.42   0.1707499 10.40
Prince Edward Island  0.1688555 9.26   0.0914310 2.53   0.1841627 8.73
Nova Scotia  0.1196213 5.26   0.1173501 2.72   0.1215067 4.56
New Brunswick  0.1443492 8.85   0.1143940 3.63   0.1508161 7.94
Quebec -0.0101455 -1.09   0.0133614 0.8   -0.0187822 -1.70
Ontario 0.0067613 0.48   -0.0129864 -0.48   0.0099365 0.61
Manitoba 0.0864655 7.56   0.0392453 1.92   0.1003586 7.38
Saskatchewan 0.0781912 5.33   0.0892141 3.38   0.0770904 4.39
Alberta -0.0387793 -2.67   -0.0320234 -1.21   -0.0350128 -2.01
Female 0.1113383 21.61 0.0661195 6.76 0.1255124 20.87
University Premium  -0.0020320 -0.35 -0.0088322 -0.78   0.0012957 0.20
Time Trend  0.0025473 2.24   0.0050409 2.19 0.0017735 1.36
Constant -0.1532562 -4.86 -0.0475932 -0.83 -0.1967119 -5.18
Number of obs.  34862 8258 26604
Adj. R-Squared    0.1346     0.1087     0.1401
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Table 15 
Logit Determinants of University Attendance: All Children, Living Independently, and Living at Home (SLID 1988-2005; sample weights used) 
 
 All  Children     Living  Independently      Living at Home 
Variable Coef.  Coef/se  Marg.  Effect  Coef. Coef/se  Marg.  Effect  Coef. Coef/se  Marg.  Effect 
Tuition 0.0000367 0.57 2.03E-06   -0.0001303 -0.84 -7.69E-06   0.0000532 0.75 2.46E-06
Income 8.17E-06 14.25 4.52E-07   0.0000185 7.06  1.09E-06   7.54E-06 11.72 3.49E-07
Income 2  -5.53E-12 -9.2 -3.06E-13   -5.80E-11 -4.02  -3.42E-12   -4.95E-12 -7.95 -2.29E-13
Children 0.5278330 5.18 0.0291949   0.6890920 2.91  0.0406738   0.5398548 4.69 0.0249697
Children 2  -0.1073121 -3.87 -0.0059355   -0.1954829 -2.99  -0.0115384   -0.0956051 -3.05 -0.0044220
Urban A  0.1945407 4.26 0.0117301   0.3663257 3.47  0.0254062   0.2338953 4.51 0.0120340
Urban B  0.4869107 15.91 0.0334620   1.0391240 14.00  0.0966966   0.3900681 11.31 0.0215661
Education                      
Single Parents: head                       
High School  0.3121463 2.38 0.0198364   -0.0212496 -0.06  -0.0012427   0.5377539 3.20 0.0318369
Some Postsec.  0.9751437 7.33 0.0832674   0.4477325 1.43  0.0321899   1.2225710 7.17 0.0992559
Postsec. Dipl.  0.7172915 6.78 0.0546461   0.3424266 1.82  0.0234991   0.9463523 6.42 0.0677184
Degree 1.7677630 15.00 0.2090191   1.3001000 4.70  0.1348925   2.0063660 12.81 0.2267441
Couples: add head effect                       
Intercept -0.0368641 -0.37 -0.0020061 -0.3420188 -2.43  -0.0174153 0.1765438 1.20 0.0088477
High School  0.2579838 1.82 0.0160022   0.3508010 1.00  0.0241631   0.0872181 0.49 0.0041966
Some Postsec.  -0.3905339 -2.66 -0.0182286   0.0662113 0.20  0.0040231   -0.6151084 -3.31 -0.0217348
Postsec. Dipl.  -0.1626861 -1.40 -0.0083784   -0.0346141 -0.16  -0.0020125   -0.3491442 -2.21 -0.0138292
Degree -0.4880828 -3.78 -0.0218570   -0.4456819 -1.48  -0.0217182   -0.6652701 -3.94 -0.0230163
Couples: spouse effect                       
High School  0.2355287 4.74 0.0144636   -0.0524363 -0.45  -0.0030251   0.2873549 4.98 0.0151522
Some Postsec.  0.2930979 4.85 0.0184679   -0.0149828 -0.11  -0.0008786   0.3486826 5.04 0.0189130
Postsec. Dipl.  0.3794957 8.19 0.0248545   0.2343395 2.35  0.0153320   0.3959986 7.27 0.0219541
Degree 0.9157195 15.71 0.0761789   0.7757271 5.93  0.0644302   0.9600757 14.32 0.0691366
Province                      
Newfoundland 0.9815127 11.88 0.0840453   0.9600993 4.64  0.0863753   0.9663493 10.59 0.0697899
Prince Edward Island  0.9579593 9.23 0.0811862   0.7209086 2.74  0.0584586   0.9882022 8.60 0.0720902
Nova Scotia  0.6862976 5.21 0.0515669   0.8271491 2.71  0.0702580   0.6692363 4.52 0.0421163
New Brunswick  0.8333731 8.79 0.0668520   0.8969757 3.95  0.0785312   0.8294762 7.86 0.0562316
Quebec -0.1055969 -1.81 -0.0055757   0.0989602 0.80  0.0061000   -0.1733425 -2.60 -0.0074185
Ontario 0.0344150 0.42 0.0019327   -0.0935478 -0.48  -0.0053011   0.0505716 0.55 0.0023932
Manitoba 0.5005233 7.33 0.0346080   0.2983690 1.97  0.0200809   0.5502992 7.13 0.0327699
Saskatchewan 0.4392592 5.11 0.0295494   0.6175459 3.28  0.0478540   0.4103519 4.19 0.0229014
Alberta -0.2727752 -3.09 -0.0133926   -0.2750035 -1.41  -0.0144097   -0.2189021 -2.18 -0.0091810
Female 0.6715090 21.64 0.0501236 0.4765780 6.62  0.0347033 0.7222816 20.88 0.0465886
University Premium  -0.0296444 -0.91 -0.0016397 -0.0643867 -0.81  -0.0038004 -0.0139958 -0.38 -0.0006473
Time Trend  0.0148423 2.21 0.0008209   0.0362488 2.20  0.0021396   0.0093523 1.26 0.0004326
Constant -3.7579060 -19.21 -3.5008100 -8.41 -4.0453870 -17.04
Number of obs.  34862 8258  26604
Log Likelihood    4749.36       912.45        3864.44  
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Appendix A 
Real Tuition Fees for Full-time Students at Canadian Universities
Year Memorial (NF)  U of PEI (PEI) Dalhousie (NS) U of NB (NB)U of Quebec (QC) U of T (ON) U of Man. (MB) U of Sask (SK)U of Alberta (AB) UBC (BC)
1975 1401 1657 1915 1632 1475 1784 1197 1278 1127 1202
1977 1208 1517 1739 1800 1276 1474 1082 1229 1193 1024
1979 1283 1515 1574 1526 1078 1515 1095 1260 1107 1103
1981 1013 1393 1520 1410 868 1457 1022 1127 982 972
1982 1009 1397 1555 1439 779 1434 1023 1109 889 984
1984 1169 1611 1801 1687 708 1561 974 1184 1039 1223
1985 1177 1645 1841 1716 678 1576 1029 1235 1084 1672
1986 1228 1713 1851 1752 647 1576 1043 1282 1078 1787
1987 1254 1814 1860 1911 619 1554 1082 1294 1067 2017
1988 1285 1844 1863 1966 596 1579 1140 1364 1142 1812
1989 1303 1868 1852 1990 571 1551 1350 1417 1127 1830
1990 1373 1863 1827 2012 547 1597 1422 1425 1149 1913
1991 1358 1855 1786 1989 866 1655 1489 1490 1252 1903
1992 1544 2120 2195 2100 1320 1770 1756 1830 1413 2046
1993 1672 2237 2391 2318 1396 1864 2001 2416 1597 1975
1994 1942 2448 2600 2426 1530 1991 2071 2182 1990 1930
1995 2059 2536 2824 2389 1637 2138 2116 2280 2181 2027
1996 2181 2683 2945 2488 1610 2312 2162 2350 2368 2102
1997 2470 2744 3170 2662 1589 2726 2241 2434 2566 2090
1998 2903 2966 3387 2929 2127 2932 2278 2544 2788 2113
1999 2858 3082 3978 3018 2232 3162 2330 3003 2966 2060
2000 2915 3124 3578 3049 2306 3349 2544 2984 3064 2015
2001 2882 3047 4056 3175 2370 3345 2310 3148 3184 1978
2002 2532 3151 4046 3338 2388 3341 2285 3081 3191 1839
2003 2214 3201 4284 3490 2399 3307 2151 3281 3140 2199
2004 2076 3328 4464 3637 2420 3314 2111 3393 3322 2803
2005 2025 3423 4672 3759 2459 3254 2058 3361 3427 3191
Source: Statistics Canada, Tuition and Living Accommodation Costs at Canadian universities. 
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Appendix B 
Summary of Observations from Survey Years 
 
Year    Female  Male  Total 
1977    2694   4056   6750 
1979    2714   3952   6666 
1981    2870   4068   6938 
1982    2995   4315   7310 
1984    2605   3801   6406 
1985    2464   3403   5867 
1986    2109   2913   5022 
1987    2868   3789   6657 
1988    2289   3069   5358 
1989    2475   3248   5723 
1990    2735   3656   6391 
1991    2452   3355   5807 
1992    2289   2907   5196 
1993    2298   3021   5319 
1994    2399   2999   5398 
1995    2003   2587   4590 
1996    2156   2478   4634 
1997    2017   2587   4604 
1998      1748   2076   3824 
1999      1741   1977   3718 
2000      1556   1772   3328 
2001      1708   1810   3518 
2002      1564   1567   3131 
2003     1574   1680   3254 
2004    1420   1522   2942 
2005    1366   1523   2889 
Grand  Total    57109   74131   131240 
Source: SCF and SLID, various years. 
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